

STATES OF JERSEY



ELECTORAL COMMISSION: COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE (P.5/2012) – MINORITY REPORT OF DEPUTIES J.A. MARTIN OF ST. HELIER AND M. TADIER OF ST. BRELADE

**Presented to the States on 15th February 2012
by the Privileges and Procedures Committee**

STATES GREFFE

MINORITY REPORT

P.5/2012: Deputies J.A. Martin of St. Helier and M. Tadier of St. Brelade

*'If there is one thing which maybe we can learn from this week's discussions it is that this problem is never going to go away, but if we had an **independent external Commission** there is more chance that something might get resolved in a proper way'*

– Former Chief Minister, Senator T.A. Le Sueur

Introduction

1. The arguments for an independent Electoral Commission, i.e. a Commission without States members, remain the same as they were when debated in March of last year. These key arguments are repeated below from paragraph 14 onwards.
2. The rôle of PPC is one of a facilitator: to bring forward proposals in line with the democratically made decisions of the States Assembly, with any amendments being lodged by individual States Members.
3. The authors of this Minority Report are of the opinion that in lodging P.5/2012, the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) have exceeded their remit by going against the instructions it was given when the States adopted the original proposition in March 2011.
4. Instead, PPC should be bringing forward proposals in line with the decision of the States in March 2011 to adopt the proposition of the former Deputy of St. Mary, P.15/2011, 'Electoral Commission: establishment'.
5. The Committee should also be bringing forward selected names for the Commission and tackling the issue of how to access outside expertise, rather than proposing amendments to the composition and terms of reference of the Commission.
6. Time is of the essence in bringing forward reform proposals ready for the 2014 elections. We would therefore ask the States to reject P.5/2012 'Electoral Commission: composition and terms of reference' and to send a message to PPC that it should continue to work towards establishing an independent Electoral Commission, as has been previously agreed by the States.

Background to P.5/2012: 'Electoral Commission: composition and terms of reference'

7. P.15/2011, 'Electoral Commission: establishment,' was adopted by the States on 15th March 2011 and clearly sets out the steps to be followed by the Privileges and Procedures Committee, as follows –

“(c) *that the Privileges and Procedures Committee, after consultation, should bring forward proposals for debate ahead of the debate on the Annual Business Plan 2012 detailing the proposed composition of the Electoral Commission, its anticipated costs, and how it is to be funded;*”

“(d) *that the Privileges and Procedures Committee should take the necessary steps to identify, through a process overseen by the Appointments Commission, the proposed membership of the Commission for subsequent approval by the Assembly on a proposition lodged by the Privileges and Procedures Committee;*”.

8. In 2011, what PPC in fact did was to present 2 reports to the States. R.54/2011 was presented to the States on 13th May 2011. It set out the issues as they saw them and invited comments, receiving just 2 submissions. R.110/2011 was presented to the States on 7th September 2011 and set out PPC’s views on the way forward, and suggested an Electoral Commission of 5 members, with a local Chairman, 2 members from Jersey and 2 expert members from outside the Island.
9. The next steps should have been a debate on their proposals, and then the recruitment of the members to the Commission, through a process overseen by the Appointments Commission as specified in P.15/2011 (see quotation above). However, the new Committee by a small majority decided to present to the States different proposals.
10. On 14th December 2011 PPC agreed to draft proposals for the Electoral Commission which would remove its independence as agreed by the States. The Committee wanted to make it possible for States members to be appointed to serve on the Commission, and even for a States member to be the chairman. We did not agree with this move and voiced our dissent.
11. On 4th January 2012, the Committee went on to agree by a majority, whilst 2 members of the Committee were away, that it would propose the appointment of 3 States members to the Commission. Apologies were received from the Deputy of St. Peter and Deputy M. Tadier of St. Brelade, but the dissent of Deputy J.A. Martin of St. Helier and the Chairman, the Connétable of St. Helier, was recorded.
12. On 11th January 2012 the Committee agreed by a margin of 3 to 2, to lodge the proposition P.5/2012 ‘Electoral Commission: composition and terms of reference’ *au Greffe* for debate by the States. The proposition asks the States to agree to appoint 3 States members, including the Chairman, to the Commission, as well as 3 independent members.
13. The proposition also asks the States to make significant cuts to the Terms of Reference of the Commission, which had been agreed by the States when they adopted P.15/2011 after lengthy debate. The agreed Terms of Reference were consciously set to be comprehensive – if they were not comprehensive, the Electoral Commission could not propose a package of reform as it is charged to do.

The importance of independence

14. The reason for adopting an independent Electoral Commission was to get rid of self-interest, or the perception of self-interest, and thus to enable the public to put forward their views on electoral reform to a transparent, unbiased body. It was also important because the States have proved themselves incapable of reform.
15. If States members are allowed to sit on the Electoral Commission, its independence will be totally undermined. The Commission should not be composed of any States members, and particularly those who have clearly stated views on the outcome of the Commission's work.
16. Prior to agreeing to draft P.5/2012, one member of PPC had expressed his desire to Chair the Electoral Commission himself.
17. After PPC agreed to draft its proposition P.5/2012, the same member suggested that PPC should bring a further proposition to the States to propose the retention of the 12 Connétables in the States and to propose a reduction in the number of States members to 42. The only decision left to make by the Commission would then be how to elect the other 30 members.
18. It was suggested that this debate should be held when the Electoral Commission was established, so that when it started its work the Commission would know where it stood. This would have completely tied the hands of the "independent" Commission as described above.
19. PPC rejected this suggestion.
20. For us, this episode highlights why it is not appropriate for States members, who may have strong pre-determined views on these matters, to serve on the Commission. States members should instead take all opportunities available to give evidence to the Commission and to provide their political views as and when appropriate, along with everyone else.
21. Moreover, it is not for the States to seek to "guide" or "steer" the work of the Commission. This is the public's Commission. It is there to provide the best possible solution for the public, not the best possible solution for States members.
22. The other reason that the Electoral Commission must be independent of the States is the proven track record of the States which shows that it cannot reform its own constitution (see Appendix 1). While some reform, such as the single Election Day, and an arbitrary reduction in the number of Senators, has been achieved, voters still have no influence over who is appointed to serve on the Council of Ministers and are unable to cast a verdict on the previous government's performance as a whole. The States have also continually failed to deliver fair representation and proportionality to the electorate.
23. Many States members have recognized the need for an independent Electoral Commission on these grounds. Former Chief Minister, Mr. T.A. Le Sueur, for example, said that many members seemed to have a desire for an Electoral Commission for 2 reasons –

“...firstly, it can look at the whole subject in proper detail, and secondly, because, as an external body, it will have a greater degree of independence than we seem to be capable of bringing to it in this Chamber. If there is one thing which maybe we can learn from this week’s discussions it is that this problem is never going to go away, but if we had an independent external Commission there is more chance that something might get resolved in a proper way”¹.

24. If the States were now to reverse their previous decision and adopt P.5/2012, the public would once again see these members as having a clear vested interest. This perception will be extremely damaging for all concerned.
25. Some people argue that independent reviews, such as the Carswell Review and Clothier, do not work because the States fail to implement their recommendations. This seems to be a problem with the States rather than the reviews themselves. This argument cannot apply to an independent Electoral Commission because the States have already agreed that the reform package proposed by the Commission will be put to the electorate in the form of a referendum, and this commitment is also restated in P.5/2012. It will therefore be the electorate, not the States, who will decide whether or not the Commission’s recommendations should be taken forward. This should be a sufficient safeguard to make sure that the recommendations of this independent Commission cannot be ignored.

Terms of reference

26. In adopting P.15/2011, the States *“agreed that an independent Electoral Commission should be established in Jersey to investigate and report on all aspects of the composition of the elected membership of the States Assembly and the election and voting processes for such members . . .”².*
27. In other words, the Electoral Commission was to be independent and it was to be comprehensive – that is, it was to look at ALL aspects of the composition of the elected membership of the States Assembly and the election and voting processes for such members.
28. If the States adopt P.5/2012, this will remove the requirement that the Electoral Commission should be independent, and the requirement that it be comprehensive in scope.
29. A decision to adopt the proposition would also remove the last 3 bullet points of the agreed terms of reference. These required the Commission to consider the functions of the electoral process; voting systems and voter registration.
30. Voting systems such as First Past the Post, STV, etc. are an integral part of electoral systems. It is not sensible to suggest that they be considered by a sub-committee of PPC distinct from the rest of the electoral reforms.

¹ In the debate on the proposition: P.176/2010 – ‘Draft States of Jersey (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 201-’ on 19th January 2011

² States Minutes of 15th March 2011 concerning P.15/2011

31. Nor is it sensible to exclude consideration of the functions of the electoral process from the work of the Electoral Commission. As the former Deputy of St. Mary wrote when proposing the Commission –

*“Elections have 2 main functions – the first is to enable the voters to **decide who represents them** in the representative assembly of their jurisdiction. This should be achieved by fair and equal representation. In Jersey this is manifestly not the case, and I covered this in my original report and proposition.*

*“The second is to enable the electorate to **cast a verdict on who they want in government and to cast a verdict on the previous government**. It is this aspect which, although implied in the original report and proposition needs to be made explicit. There should be a link between the vote or votes the voter casts in the voting booth and the end result that matters most to voters which is: who gets to have decision-making powers in their jurisdiction.”³*

32. Can it really be suggested that the Electoral Commission be barred from considering such self-evidently vital issues by removing them from the Terms of Reference?

33. The report accompanying P.5/2012 states that it is intended to look at the issue of voter registration internally, but it would be remiss not to take the opportunity of gathering both the public’s views on this topic and those of any expert advisers working to the Commission. It should be noted that in Jersey, voter registration lags far behind other jurisdictions so that it is a serious issue in its own right and could even affect the outcome of elections, so low is the figure (see Appendix 2).

34. The States have agreed that the guiding principles of the Commission’s investigation should be –

(i)

(ii) *the need to ensure that the views of the electorate were reflected as effectively and as fairly as possible in the make-up of the States and of the Executive, namely the Chief Minister, Ministers and Assistant Ministers;*⁴.

35. The Terms of Reference as agreed allow this guiding principle to be met. All these topics are linked. Excluding vital elements of the Terms of Reference removes any capacity for the Commission to suggest an integrated package of reform which does the job asked of it.

³ In the report accompanying the Amendment of the former Deputy of St. Mary to P.15/2011 establishing the Electoral Commission

⁴ States Minutes of 15th March 2011 concerning P.15/2011

“Locally-based” membership of the Commission and the need for expertise

36. In the report accompanying the proposition, PPC says that, while it has not been prescriptive about it in the proposition, it would prefer members who are locally-based or have very strong Jersey connections to be appointed to serve on the Commission. We believe that this is an error of judgment. The report (page 7) puts too much emphasis upon the ‘culture’ and ‘context’ of the Island, rather than relevant expertise of individuals who would be able to assist in bringing an appropriate package of electoral reform for the Island.
37. Local concerns will not fall by the wayside if the Commission has access to expertise. They are safeguarded in many ways. There will be local members on the Commission itself. Most, if not all, of those who will make submissions to the Electoral Commission will be local, or have strong local connections. This should be sufficient to ensure that any package of reform that is proposed by the Commission is workable within the Jersey context.
38. P.5/2012 (page 7) tries to make the case for not having external expertise as part of the work of the Commission. However, this ignores the fact that the States are well aware of the need to balance local input with specialist advice in other areas. Examples of the added value that external experts can and do bring to the Island are the independent Fiscal Policy Panel (FPP), who advise on our economy and who have raised the level of economic debate and decision-making in the Island; the Verita report, which began the process of needed reform in our hospital; Professor Forder who advised the Health, Social Security and Housing Scrutiny Panel about models for funding elderly care, and whose expertise underpins the solution we now have to this question. There are many other examples.
39. In all these cases, outside expertise has helped us. Outside expertise should provide quality of thought. True experts have their professional reputations to consider, so will not put their name to advice that would not withstand the scrutiny of their peers. Also, precisely because they come from outside they have no set view on “Jersey” issues.
40. A key issue with the Electoral Commission is always going to be bias or the perception of bias. It is not only States members who have fixed views on electoral reform. Any local person sitting on the Electoral Commission, however enthusiastic, conscientious and committed to the task they may be, is most likely to have a previous view on what form electoral reform in Jersey might take.
41. There is nothing wrong with this – it is inevitable. But it points up the need to have a mechanism for ensuring fair play for all. The ONLY way to counteract possible bias within the Commission is to have external independent expertise available to the Commission either within the Commission itself or in the form of an expert advisory panel.
42. The question then is: which is better? We agree with PPC that having external experts on the Panel itself might lead to delay in the Commission’s work. We believe that the advisory panel solution is both cheaper, and more transparent.

43. It is cheaper because the costs of flights and accommodation are avoided, as are the costs and complications involved in making arrangements. The report accompanying P.5/2012 says that outside experts would slow the work of the Commission because of these issues. This is not the case with an off-Island Advisory Panel, which would write papers on specific issues, and offer ongoing challenge and advice to the Commission from wherever they are, just as the FPP does.
44. It is more transparent because the public will be able to see what the independent expert advice was on any given point, and whether or not it was accepted, and the reasons given by the Commissioners as to why the advice was accepted or rejected.
45. The outside experts are the “check and balance”. We pay for outside expertise on our economy, in the shape of the “three wise men and women” of the FPP – are we saying that this one-off review of our electoral system, after 60 years of no change, can be done or should be done with no outside expertise at all? Are we saying that it is not that important?
46. And the task of the Commission is to find a package of reform which will command public support, and this will be demonstrated via the requirement for a referendum. The referendum is the ultimate guarantee that local concerns will always be at the forefront of the Electoral Commission’s mind.

Conclusion

47. If States Members adopt P.5/2012, they will be agreeing to remove the independence of the Electoral Commission as agreed by the States in March 2011. This would make it far more difficult, if not impossible, to secure public acceptance that the process will be fair to all.
48. The adoption of P.5/2012 would also hamper the work of the Commission by cutting out major and vital elements of the Terms of Reference, without which the Commission will not be able to bring forward a coherent package of reform as they have been tasked to do.
49. We therefore strongly disagree with the Committee’s proposition, and we ask States members to reject P.5/2012.

APPENDIX 1

PROPOSITIONS ON STATES REFORM 1999 – 2009

(SOURCE: *States Greffe*)

Projet	Title
P.199/99	SENATORS AND DEPUTIES: TERMS OF OFFICE
P.122/2001	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: PROPOSED REFORMS
P.146/2001	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: SPECIAL COMMITTEE
P.175/2001	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: COMPOSITION AND ROLE OF PRIVILEGES AND PROCEDURE AND SCRUTINY COMMITTEES
P.179/2001	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: THE COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.3/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: METHOD OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
P.6/2002	DRAFT STATES' REFORM (ELECTION OF SENATORS) (JERSEY) LAW 200-
P.23/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIVILEGES AND PROCEDURES COMMITTEE
P.25/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM OF REPRESENTATION
P.26/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.142/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM OF REPRESENTATION
P.149/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: ELECTION AND REMOVAL OF MINISTERS AND VOTES OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTERS
P.186/2002	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.115/2004	COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.151/2004	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT REFORM: COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.195/2004	MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT REFORM: ELECTION OF SENATORS
P.227/2004	SENATORS AND DEPUTIES: TERMS OF OFFICE
P.1/2005	REFERENDUM: COMPOSITION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY
P.3/2005	CONNÉTABLES: VOLUNTARY RE-ELECTION IN 2005
P.17/2005	SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 2005:REDUCED TERM OF OFFICE
P.221/2005	SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 2005

- P.145/2006 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY: PROPOSED REFORM
- P.4/2007 ELECTORAL REFORM
- P.54/2007 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY: ELECTION DATES FOR CONNÉTABLES
- P.75/2007 COMPOSITION OF THE STATES: REVISED STRUCTURE AND REFERENDUM
- P.86/2007 COMPOSITION OF THE STATES: REFERENDUM
- P.98/2007 DEPUTIES: EXTENSION OF TERMS OF OFFICE TO 4 YEARS
- P.72/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: REVISED STRUCTURE
- P.109/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: SINGLE ELECTION DAY EACH YEAR
- P.138/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: ABOLITION OF 6 SENATORIAL POSITIONS IN 2011

P.199/99 SENATORS AND DEPUTIES: TERMS OF OFFICE

(Withdrawn by proposer, Deputy A. Breckon of St. Saviour, 12th December 2000)

P.179/2001 MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: THE COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY

(Withdrawn by proposer, Policy and Resources Committee, 12th February 2002)

P.6/2002 DRAFT STATES' REFORM (ELECTION OF SENATORS) (JERSEY) LAW 200-

(Withdrawn by proposer, Policy and Resources Committee, 12th February 2002)

P.186/2002 MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY

(Withdrawn by proposer, Special Committee on the Composition and Election of the States Assembly, 21st October 2003)

P.115/2004 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY

("be not considered on 20th July 2004" – adopted)

("be not considered on 14th September 2004" – adopted)

(then withdrawn by proposer, Deputy of St. Martin, 28th September 2004)

P.151/2004 MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT REFORM: COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY

THE STATES rejected the amendment of the Deputy of St. Ouen, 24th November 2004 (35 members by parish and 12 Connétables)

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy Maurice François Dubras, 24th November 2004 (37 members only, by parish and district)

THE STATES rejected an amendment of the Deputy of St. Martin, 24th November 2004 (42 members only, by parish and district)

THE STATES rejected paragraph (a)(iii) requesting them to agree in principle that the 12 Parish Connétables should no longer be members of the States by virtue of their office.

THE STATES rejected paragraph (a)(iv) requesting them to agree in principle that the present positions of Senator and Deputy should be abolished and replaced with 47 States members elected in 6 new constituencies.

THE STATES rejected paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) requesting them to agree in principle that all members of the States should be elected on a single general election day and for a fixed term of office of 4 years, and that the general election should be held in the Spring with effect from the next set of elections after 2005.

P.151/2004 – 23rd and 24th November 2004 – 5¾ hours

P.195/2004 MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT REFORM: ELECTION OF SENATORS

(Withdrawn by proposer, Deputy S.C. Ferguson of St. Brelade, 24th November 2004)

P.227/2004 SENATORS AND DEPUTIES: TERMS OF OFFICE

(“move to next item” adopted on 1st February 2005)

(then withdrawn by proposer, Deputy A. Breckon of St. Saviour, 6th June 2006)

P.221/2004 SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 2005

THE STATES rejected the proposition of Deputy P.N. Troy of St. Brelade that enabled Senators elected in 2002 to stand again in 2005 to allow voters to pass judgement on their suitability to be Ministers.

P.221/2004 – 1st February 2005 – 2½ hours

P.1/2005 REFERENDUM: COMPOSITION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY

THE STATES rejected the proposition of Senator Leonard Norman, 2nd February 2005, referendum on Senators in the States, Constables in the States, 42–44 members.

P.1/2005 – 2nd February 2005 – 1½ hours

P.3/2005 CONNÉTABLES: VOLUNTARY RE-ELECTION IN 2005

(Withdrawn by proposer, Senator M.E. Vibert, 1st February 2005, after the defeat of P.221/2004 of Deputy P.N. Troy of St. Brelade)

P.17/2005 SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 2005:REDUCED TERM OF OFFICE

THE STATES rejected the proposition of the Deputy of St. Martin, to agree that the term of office of the Senators elected in the senatorial elections to be held in October 2005 should be reduced from 6 years to 3 years.

P.17/2005 – 22nd March 2005 – 1 hour

P.145/2006 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY: PROPOSED REFORM

1st and 2nd May 2007

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy G.P. Southern of St. Helier re the proposed election date

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy G.P. Southern of St. Helier re the ex officio status of the Constables and adding 8 Deputies

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy J.A.N. Le Fondré of St. Lawrence re single election day and only 8 Senators

THE STATES rejected amendments of Deputy A. Breckon of St. Saviour to the amendment of the Privileges and Procedures Committee that – swapping Deputies and Constables in the wording

THE STATES rejected the amendments of the Privileges and Procedures Committee that –

Lots of different things, mainly, Senators and Constables' election, then a Deputies' election

THE STATES rejected the amendment of the Privileges and Procedures Committee – to add a referendum clause

Senator B.E. Shenton withdrew that the Chief Minister must be a Senator

THE STATES rejected paragraph (a)(i) to (a)(iii) of the proposition of Senator B.E. Shenton that – general election day with 8 Senators, and 4 year term for all

THE STATES adopting paragraph (a)(v) of the proposition of Senator B.E. Shenton, agreed that election expenses by candidates seeking election to the States should be regulated, etc.

P.4/2007 ELECTORAL REFORM

2nd May 2007 – move to next item

P.145/2006 and P.4/2007 – all the first day after questions and 3 statements and 3/5 of the second day

P.75/2007 COMPOSITION OF THE STATES: REVISED STRUCTURE AND REFERENDUM

17th and 18th July 2007

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy G.P. Southern of St. Helier re 48 members in 6 large districts

THE STATES rejected an amendment of Deputy G.C.L. Baudains of St. Clement re 36 Deputies proportionally on a parish or district basis – not sure of the context for this

THE STATES, adopted an amendment of Deputy G.P. Southern of St. Helier to conduct a thorough review of the electoral register and the voter registration process by 2010 at the latest

THE STATES rejected the proposition of the Privileges and Procedures Committee, as amended, for 12 Constables plus 36 Deputies in 6 large districts, single election day by 2011, and four year term, voting system review, and referendum to endorse.

P.86/2007 COMPOSITION OF THE STATES: REFERENDUM

18th and 19th July 2007

THE STATES rejected the proposition of Senator J.L. Perchard to hold a referendum with 4 options: (1) 12 Connétables and 36 Deputies elected on a super-constituency basis. (2) 12 Connétables and 36 Deputies elected on a Parish basis. (3) 12 Senators, elected on an Island-wide basis, and 36 Deputies elected on a Parish or constituency basis. (4) all 48 Members of an Assembly to be known as Deputies *à la Clothier* and to be allocated across the 12 Parishes in an as equitable as possible fashion.

P.54/2007 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES ASSEMBLY: ELECTION
DATES FOR CONNÉTABLE

19th July 2007

THE STATES adopted a proposition of the Comité des Connétables –single election
day for the 12 parish Connétables and a four year term

**P.75/2007, P.86/2007 and P.54/2007 – 1/7 of 17th July, all of 18th July, ¾ of 19th
July 2007**

P.98/2007 DEPUTIES: EXTENSION OF TERMS OF OFFICE TO 4 YEARS

26th September 2007

THE STATES adopted a proposition of Deputy P.N. Troy of St. Brelade, four year
terms for Deputies, with effect from the Deputies' elections in the autumn of 2008

1/6 of the day

P.72/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: REVISED STRUCTURE

8th and 9th September 2009

This one is within living memory

1/6 of 8th and all of 9th September 2009

P.109/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: SINGLE ELECTION DAY EACH
YEAR

10th September 2009

This one also is within living memory

3/5 of 10th September

P.138/2009 COMPOSITION AND ELECTION OF THE STATES: ABOLITION OF
6 SENATORIAL POSITIONS IN 2011

8th October 2009, brief debate

AND THEN COMES 2010 and 2011where we started.

PROPOSITIONS ON STATES REFORM 1999 – 2009:
COST OF SITTINGS CONCERNING COMPOSITION OF THE STATES

NOTE: £1,800 per hour is the rough cost of the States when sitting (calculation by the Greffe for Senator B.E. Shenton)

So to these sums must be ADDED the cost of preparation time by members, the cost of preparing the documents, the work of the officers

The timings below have been done by DW from Hansard, and if pre-Hansard, by the Greffier, to whom thanks!

P.151/2004 – 23rd and 24th November 2004 – 5¾ hours

P.221/2004 – 1st February 2005 – 2½ hours

P.1/2005 – 2nd February 2005 – 1½ hours

P.17/2005 – 22nd March 2005 – 1 hour

P.145/2006 and P.4/2007 – all the first day after questions and 3 statements and 3/5 of the second day

P.75/2007, P.86/2007 and P.54/2007 – 1/7 of 17th July, all of 18th July, ¾ of 19th July 2007

P.98/2007 – 1/6 of the day

P.72/2009 – 1/6 of 8th September and all of 9th September 2009

P.109/2009 – 3/5 of 10th September

+ all of 2010 and 2011

TOTAL 1999–2009 = 44 hours, PLUS 2010 and 2011

2010 + 2011 = say 20 hours

ESTIMATED TOTAL = 64 hours @ £1,800/hour = £115,200 – Sitting time only
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APPENDIX 2

VOTER REGISTRATION: VARIOUS COUNTRIES

	Total registered voters	Total voting age population	Percentage registered	Year of data
Denmark	4,022,920	4,186,873	96.08%	2007
France	43,888,483	48,651,555	90.21%	2007
Luxembourg	217,979	353,691	61.63%	2004
New Zealand	2,990,759	3,052,985	97.96%	2008
UK	44,245,939	46,554,470	95.04%	2005
Isle of Man			85.00%	current
Jersey			77.18%	2008

First 5 countries: *Source: turnout Tables by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)*

Isle of Man: *Source: personal communication*

Jersey: *Source: PPC Report for P.72, paragraph 8.11, adjusted by removing the 18% who are below working age*

From: "ADDENDUM TO P.15", by the former Deputy of St. Mary, circulated in the States prior to the debate on P.15/2011